Antitrust law
How to analyze tying claims in two sided markets where harms may affect multiple stakeholder groups differently.
In two sided markets, tying claims require a careful, multidimensional assessment that weighs how different stakeholder groups—consumers, platform users, and ancillary partners—are affected, balancing economic incentives, competitive dynamics, and potential welfare consequences across platforms.
August 03, 2025 - 3 min Read
In contemporary antitrust practice, tying claims in two sided markets demand a structured framework that recognizes the distinctive economics of platforms. A two sided market hosts interdependent groups whose demand curves interact through cross-side network effects. When a firm bundles a product sold to one side with a product or service on another, it can alter competitive dynamics in complex ways. Analysts must first clarify the structure of the platform, the nature of the tying arrangement, and the specific products involved. They should map how price signals transmit across sides, identify barriers to entry, and assess whether the tying increases total welfare or merely redistributes surplus among participants.
The initial step is to articulate the theory of harm with explicit welfare considerations. Courts often seek to determine whether tying forecloses rivals, raises prices, or reduces choices in a way that cannot be easily offset by procompetitive benefits. In two sided contexts, however, harms may manifest unevenly across groups: one side may experience higher prices or reduced access while another side benefits from improved quality or increased platform value. Scholars and practitioners must therefore differentiate effects on consumers, businesses, and platform developers. An analytical model should translate these qualitative outcomes into testable hypotheses about market structure, pricing, adoption, and dynamic investment.
Market power on each side shapes harms and defenses to tying claims.
A rigorous analysis begins with defining the product and service bundle that constitutes the tying claim. The bundle must be evaluated in light of how each component serves the needs of separate user groups. Analysts should examine whether the tied product is indispensable to access certain features or to compete effectively on the platform. This involves near-term pricing assessments and longer horizon projections about market entry, feature development, and user migration patterns. In two sided markets, the value of the bundle often lies not merely in the components themselves but in the synergy created by their combination, which can shift the competitive landscape in ways that traditional single-sided analysis would overlook.
Next, it is essential to assess market power on both sides of the platform. Traditional metrics, such as concentration ratios, can be misleading when interdependent demand is at play. A platform may wield monopoly power on one side while preserving healthy competition on the other, and the tying decision could deepen or mitigate those asymmetries. Analysts should examine supply chain relationships, exclusive contracts, and data access dynamics that influence bargaining power. Importantly, the analysis must consider potential countervailing advantages that innovative incumbents offer, including superior user experience, broader ecosystem effects, and the ability to attract complementary developers or advertisers.
Empirical testing and counterfactual reasoning illuminate causal impacts.
The welfare evaluation must consider both static and dynamic dimensions. Static effects look at immediate price changes, access restrictions, and allocation efficiency. Dynamic effects focus on incentives to innovate, invest, and commit to platform quality. In two sided markets, tying can affect investment in essential features or data infrastructure that enable critical interactions across sides. If tying dampens entry or reduces the variety of offers available to a side, the platform may enjoy short-term gains but incur long-run costs through reduced experimentation by rivals and slower technological progress. Policymakers must weigh these trade-offs against potential gains from alignment, standardization, or improved user experience.
The analysis should incorporate empirical testing and counterfactual reasoning. Researchers can compare analogous platforms with and without tying provisions, controlling for market characteristics and user demographics. Natural experiments, regulatory interventions, or variations in contract terms across regions provide valuable data. In two sided markets, researchers must account for network effects, diffusion of innovations, and cross-border differences in consumer behavior. The goal is to estimate the causal impact of tying on prices, output, product availability, and overall welfare, while ensuring that measurement errors do not obscure genuine harms or benefits across stakeholder groups.
Efficiency claims must be credible, verifiable, and narrowly tailored.
A critical element is the identification of procompetitive effects. Some tying arrangements may reduce search costs, simplify onboarding for new users, or enable bundled innovations that otherwise would be unattainable. In two sided markets, such efficiencies can be substantial if the tying arrangement accelerates platform growth, improves data quality, or enables more effective matchmaking. Analysts should quantify these benefits and compare them to any foreclosed competition or diminished choice. The central question remains whether the net welfare change is positive for society, considering both sides’ experiences and the platform’s long-term health.
Yet the presence of potential efficiencies does not automatically excuse tying practices. Courts require a careful demonstration that claimed efficiencies are verifiable, sufficiently specific, and appropriately labeled. In two sided markets, proving that efficiency gains cannot be achieved through less restrictive means becomes more challenging, as alternative structures can often replicate some benefits without the same competitive drawbacks. Consequently, the burden of persuasion rests on showing that tying yields a net improvement in welfare and does not merely subsidize platform power at the expense of rivals or consumers.
Remedies should balance competitive goals with platform viability and growth.
Another important consideration is the regulatory and competitive landscape. Antitrust analysis should be contextualized within the broader policy objectives of promoting competition, safeguarding innovation, and ensuring consumer welfare. In two sided markets, regulators may be especially attentive to data control, access, and interoperability. Tying provisions can interact with privacy laws, content moderation policies, and platform governance in ways that amplify or mask harms. Effective analysis requires collaboration across disciplines, including economics, law, and data science, to capture the nuanced effects on all stakeholders and to propose remedies that are proportionate to the identified harms.
Remedies in tying cases on two sided platforms must be carefully tailored. One-size-fits-all solutions risk undermining beneficial network effects or stifling beneficial investments. Possible remedies include structural separations, divestitures of specific bundled components, or behavioral constraints that reduce coercion while preserving essential platform functions. Authorities should design remedies that preserve the viability of the platform’s value proposition for both sides, while restoring competitive incentives for rivals and ensuring that consumers retain meaningful choices. Monitoring, sunset clauses, and robust data transparency mechanisms can help ensure that remedies adapt to evolving market dynamics.
Finally, the ethical and legal dimensions must inform every stage of the analysis. Analysts should document assumptions, disclose limitations, and be transparent about uncertainties. The two sided market framework requires humility about predictive power, given rapid technological change and shifting consumer preferences. Practitioners must avoid overreliance on any single model and instead triangulate evidence from theory, empirical data, and regulatory experience. Clear, well-supported conclusions help courts and policymakers evaluate whether a tying claim warrants enforcement action, a negotiated settlement, or a refined regulatory approach that protects competition without stifling beneficial platform development.
In sum, analyzing tying claims in two sided markets with differential stakeholder harms demands a holistic approach. It requires mapping interdependencies across sides, assessing power dynamics, evaluating welfare effects, scrutinizing potential efficiencies, and proposing targeted remedies. By integrating rigorous economic reasoning with careful statutory interpretation, lawyers and economists can provide decision-makers with robust, context-sensitive guidance. The ultimate objective remains to safeguard competition, foster innovation, and protect the diverse interests of all participants who contribute to the vitality of modern multi-sided platforms.
